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This paper seeks to provide an extended critical overview of crucial issues and 
dilemmas within contemporary social thought, as well as within the wide field of 
social science theory and methodology. In this context, it offers some necessary 
theoretical stimulations and perspectives to re-think seriously and imaginatively 
and to re-decide about the persistent, complicated, ambiguous and highly dis-
puted topics of predictability/unpredictability, reflexivity, and normativity (eth-
ics). It is argued that useful synthetic insights from chaos/complexity theory can 
and should play a significant role in correcting well-established lines of thought 
(namely, realism and critical realism), as well as in adequately addressing these 
crucial general issues.
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1. Introduction
Chaos and complexity are frequently not fully understandable to many 
people. However, they both have undoubtedly altered – and continue to 
alter – the way in which we daily experience and confront ourselves, the 
others, and our social/physical environment. In the course of the last dec-
ades, they have gradually formed an overwhelming conceptual pair that has 
challenged, doubted and de-stabilized our “old”, “traditional” or “received” 
analytic frameworks within which we perceive and perform our individual 
and collective lives.
Although “complexity theory” is usually involved with the spontane-
ous emergence of silence (well-organized behaviour) out of noise (many 
heterogeneous elements), while “chaos theory” explores how silence (sim-
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ple systems) gives rise to noise (complicated unpredictable behaviour),1 
the present article will particularly refer to “chaos/complexity theory” as a 
(more or less) joint line of thought, as well as to “chaos/complexity” as an 
inherent natural and social force (an essential feature), in direct contrast to 
“order” – that is, an emerging human tendency.
It is exactly the latter tendency that often makes us to treat various in-
stabilities, fragilities and uncertainties as fully predictable. In other words, 
it makes us suffer from the so-called “illusion of control”, which assumes 
predictability and implicitly pervades all aspects of our “fluid” daily lives 
(with perhaps innumerable negative implications for our psychosocial well-
being); it silently fools all of us “into thinking the future is more predict-
able and less uncertain than it really is” (Makridakis, Hogarth and Gaba, 
2009: ix).
The chaos/complexity innovative analytic framework might possibly 
help us to reflect critically and responsibly upon this catastrophic social 
“illusion”, as well as to understand better and explain (in a non-reduc-
tionistic way) the overwhelming, speedy, interdependent/interconnected and 
“relational” phenomena that increasingly surround us, such as globalization, 
cultural diversity (multiculturalism), religious or national fundamentalism, 
ethnic conflicts, technoscientific change, etc.
For instance, as Anthony Giddens smartly observes, “globalization it-
self is far more than just an economic phenomenon. It’s a set of processes 
that increasingly links our personal lives, even intimate aspects of them, to 
global events – the controversy over the Islamic headscarf is just such an 
example... The stage is set for a return to the social” (Giddens, 2006).
Within the wide field of debate provided by chaos/complexity, in gen-
eral, we can clearly see that contemporary “human complex systems” are 
not predictable – at least, not beyond a relatively short “predictability hori-
zon”. In fact, even if we know the very initial conditions of any system to 
an astonishingly high degree of accuracy, unpredictability still reigns. But 
nevertheless we do not actually need predictability, periodicity, stability and 
equilibrium, exactly because we do not need a hopeless, colourless, dull 
and boring world!
1 For Ken Hatt, there are two specific differences between chaos and complexity: “first, 
chaotic behaviour usually results from the nonlinear interaction of a few equations while 
in complex systems many components are interacting… second, chaotic behaviour exhibits 
a sensitivity to initial conditions, which is not the case for complex systems that are, in 
some cases, quite robust and capable of persisting in response to a variety of conditions… 
Chaos can be seen, then, as a possible precursor or manifestation of complexity” (Hatt, 
2009: 317).
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We can also see that interdisciplinarity/transdisciplinarity (and, even-
tually, non-disciplinarity), in its very synthetic and integrative “nature”, 
potentially re-shapes the condition of contemporary social/sociological 
thought, allowing us to overcome decisively the harmful dualistic schemes 
of thinking about the individual and society, action and structure, agency 
and system, subjectivity and objectivity.
The present work turns a highly interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary lens 
of chaos/complexity to main social epistemological issues (such as reflexiv-
ity and normativity), which have not been previously rendered so directly 
connected to chaos/complexity. Thus, it highlights the chaos/complexity’s 
potential theoretical and methodological contribution to the present and fu-
ture of social thought.
By responsibly adjudicating between alternative theoretical/meth-
odological propositions and thereby interconnecting the currently isolated 
schools of thought, the permanent search for truth and knowledge is argua-
bly becoming “open not closed, dynamic not static, inclusive not exclusive, 
current not outdated, affirming not denying, innovative not conservative 
and most of all, living not dead” (Whitworth and Friedman, 2009).2
This paper seeks to present an updated overview of the exciting “in-
stallation” of chaos/complexity in the changing realm of social thought, as 
well as a fresh source of inspirations for the promising relationship between 
chaos/complexity and social/sociological theories.
Through the valuable prism of chaos and complexity, it offers an ex-
tended critical discussion of crucial issues and dilemmas within contem-
porary social thought, as well as within the wide field of social science 
theory and methodology (such as knowledge, objectivity/subjectivity, struc-
ture/agency, self-organization, ethics and values). In this analytical context, 
it formulates some necessary theoretical stimulations and methodological 
perspectives seriously and imaginatively to re-think and re-decide about the 
persistent, ambiguous, complicated and highly disputed topics of predict-
ability/unpredictability, reflexivity, and normativity.
2. Science and models of science
The general priority of epistemology (theory of knowledge), as the undis-
puted and necessary pre-condition for any research area or scientific field, 
has overwhelmingly characterized human inquiry from the very beginning 
of the Enlightenment to the middle decades of the twentieth century (see 
2 We thus need to open up decisively the social sciences “not only towards the world, but 
also internally. The barriers between the various scientific disciplines need to be crossed” 
(Cilliers, 1998: 127).
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e.g. Taylor, 1995). The “epistemological primacy” over “ontological ques-
tions” (that is, over the very object of things under investigation) is some-
times known as epistemic fallacy. In other words, epistemic fallacy is the 
reduction of being in favour of knowledge: “there are instances where the 
prominence of knowledge about something rather than on the ‘something’. 
That is to say, there is a tendency to emphasize what we know about and 
not the object of knowing” (Resca, 2009).
In the second part of the 20th century, however, the emerging will to 
avoid “epistemic fallacy” raised the systematic theoretical need to balance 
carefully between epistemology and ontology, or between subjectivism and 
objectivism/realism (given that they are not radically incommensurable). 
This increasingly turned social researchers’ analytic attention to the very 
“nature” of models and modelling – that is, modes of representing social 
phenomena.
In such an analytical context, the so-called “isomorphism” (ontological 
correspondence) implies that the model and the “real” research object are 
structurally similar (or analogous). According to the Dutch Distinguished 
Professor of Philosophy Bastiaan Cornelis van Fraassen (1980), this signi-
fies what exactly science aims to offer (van Fraassen, 1980):
•  “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate: and 
acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically 
adequate… such a theory has at least one model that all the actual 
phenomena fit inside [p. 12] ... To present a theory is to specify a 
family of structures, its models, and secondly, to specify certain parts 
of those models [the empirical substructures] as candidates for the 
direct representation of observable phenomena” (p. 64).
•  “The structures which can be described in experimental and measure-
ment reports we can call appearances: the theory is empirically ad-
equate if it has some model such that all appearances are isomorphic 
to empirical substructures of that model” (p. 64).
In parallel, the UCLA Professor Bill McKelvey analytically juxtaposes 
these salient theoretical points with the “plausibility theory” thesis, mainly 
characterized by the following elements (McKelvey, 1999):
•  The law-like propositions of any theory should also be “based on a 
model…which expresses the common ontology accepted by the com-
munity” (p. 391). That is, any theoretical model should more or less 
represent that part of the real social phenomena defined by the very 
scope of the theory (ontological adequacy).
 Charalambos Tsekeris: Reconstructing Main Epistemological Issues..., Revija za sociologiju 40 (2010), 3: 247–271
 251
•  Both increasing experimental adequacy and ontological adequacy 
(which increase plausibility) “are inductive grounds for a claim of 
increasing verisimilitude…” (p. 391).
•  “The content of a theory consists of a pair of models…, that is, both 
the descriptive [ontological adequacy] and the explanatory [experi-
mental adequacy] model” (p. 393) should represent the real phenom-
ena. As science evolves and progresses, this pair of models would 
merge into one model.
McKelvey (1999) concisely concludes that these elements lead to a 
“model centered strategy in science”, or a “New Science”, according to 
which the socially constructed and epistemically relativist (and fallible) 
model is located at the very heart of the scientific method. The social re-
searcher thus develops and demonstrates the ontological adequacy and ex-
perimental adequacy of this model by reference to empirical substructures, 
observed phenomena and counter factual arguments.
This fruitful line of thought heavily draws on the realist philosophy of 
John Searle (1995), who comprehensively argued that “realism and a cor-
respondence conception [of truth] are essential presuppositions of any sane 
philosophy, not to mention of any science” (Searle, 1995: xiii). In direct 
contrast to idealism, for Searle (1995: 150), “the world (or alternatively, 
reality or the universe) exists independently of our representations of it”. 
Within such an analytic framework, empirical science should strategically 
seek to formulate true explanatory theories or, at least, to continue to chal-
lenge, question and criticize its theories, always keeping a distinction or 
hiatus between objective knowledge and subjective knowledge (see Popper, 
1992). In the same line, Mario Bunge (2001) describes an objective real-
ity (arranged in levels and distinctly different from the conceptual world), 
where qualitatively new phenomena can spontaneously emerge from lower 
levels (emergence). This argument was systematically elaborated by critical 
or relational realism.
3. The tradition of critical realism
In general, critical realism3 primarily aims to re-explore the possibility of 
naturalism in the social sciences and can be characterized as a “third way” 
(a middle ground) between the positivist/naturalist tradition (philosophically 
grounded on the work of Hume, Comte, Mill, Mach, and the Vienna Circle) 
and the anti-positivist/anti-naturalist tradition (philosophically grounded on 
the work of Vico, Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, Husserl, and Wittgenstein).
3 “Critical realism” is a denomination that arose by the purposeful elision of the terms 
“transcendental realism” and “critical naturalism”.
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The main representative of critical realism, the British philosopher Roy 
Bhaskar, assertively argues that, within the mentioned analytical context of 
epistemic fallacy, ontology is (somehow, simply or sophisticatedly) reduced 
to “our ways of knowing” and “our knowledge of it” (Bhaskar, 1989: 181). 
In fact, as William Outhwaite comprehensively concludes, both empiricism 
and idealism “reduce ontology to epistemology, questions about being to 
questions about our knowledge of being. And in so doing they also retain 
an implicit ontology of the ‘empirical world”’ (Outhwaite, 1987: 32).
Moreover, the critical realist view is principally based on the distinction 
Roy Bhaskar made between the “intransitive” and “transitive” aspects of all 
scientific inquiry. Where “intransitive” aspects of scientific inquiry refer to 
those deep causes, sequences, mechanisms in the natural and social worlds 
which exist “independently of identification by human beings” (Bhaskar, 
1989: 17), the “transitive” objects of science refer to human knowledge 
and understanding of the independently existing world of things (Bhaskar, 
1989: 18).4 That is, transitive objects of science refer to the “human de-
scriptions of reality” and intransitive to the independent “reality which the 
[transitive descriptions] attempt to describe” (Outhwaite, 1987: 35).
Critical realists openly reject all forms of idealism, rationalism, or sol-
ipsistic relativism, insisting instead on a real world of things independent of 
human beings (that is, a real world which has not been constructed, defined 
or is in another way dependent on humans).
This is no less true in the human and social sciences as in the physical 
and natural realms. According to critical realism, there is a real physical 
and social world of independent phenomena which cannot be reduced to 
language or discourse or human constructions of knowledge.
But, by scholastically focusing on overcoming “epistemic fallacy”, as 
well as on studying structure at the expense of culture and agency, critical 
realists (with the remarkable exception of William Outhwaite) have not 
paid adequate attention to meaning and language.
Nevertheless, language is indeed real and has to be systematically 
theorized as an irreducible “causal power”, which silently structures the 
social and physical world as meaningful. So, critical realism does not really 
succeed to address efficiently the radical difference between two competing 
lines of thought:
(1)  On the one hand, the Marxian tradition and the concomitant fear 
of committing the so-called “linguistic fallacy”, or the “reification 
4 Hence, Roy Bhaskar’s analytical orientation is mostly upon the (unobservable) causal 
mechanisms creating the (observable) emergent properties of interdependent structural sys-
tems or ontological layers.
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of language”, which naively reduces the world to language (just as 
Rorty did), social action to “performance”, and the human subject 
to an unstable patchwork of signifiers (the case of Baudrillard) or 
to an endless chain of discursive identifications, has unavoidably 
led to a serious underestimation of the causal power of language.
(2)  On the other hand, the highly heterogeneous nexus of post-structur-
alism, post-modernism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, feminism, 
gender and queer studies, archaeology/genealogy and other de-
constructivist approaches, such as Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, which 
often does not recognize anything “outside of the text” (Derrida) 
and has more or less tended to impede or delete the critical impetus 
of hermeneutics.5
4. The standpoint of chaos/complexity theory
More generally, Roy Bhaskar’s persistent underestimation of language/
meaning issues, as well as his monistic analytical emphasis upon the 
“rationality” of agents and the “reality” of entities, structures, generative 
mechanisms and causal powers, more or less abstracts his attention from 
the very richness of the social world and the human complex networks. 
This is exactly the field where new synthetic insights from chaos/complex-
ity theory can offer useful corrections and orientations. In specific, chaos/
complexity theory, elaborated below, can see what critical realism does not 
clearly recognize and acknowledge – that is, “the impossibility of connect-
ing all elements together, the impossibility of complete observation and 
representation of phenomena that would require connecting each element 
with every other element” (Luhmann, 1995: 55).
According to David Byrne, the knowledge footsteps and epistemologi-
cal claims of the scientific realism of Roy Bhaskar are fruitfully followed 
and creatively extended by chaos/complexity theory. He maintains that while 
“positivism was dead… and starting to smell” and the relativism of post-
modernism was “bone idleness promoted to a metatheoretical programme” 
(Byrne, 1998: 37, 45), chaos/complexity is now offering the unique pos-
5 Unlike post-structuralism and post-modernism, hermeneutics does not, however, reduce 
the “sign” to a phantasmagoric play of “signifiers” without any “signified” (a real object 
or reference). It does not naively absorb or collapse the intransitive (ontological) into the 
transitive (epistemological) dimension. Language, after all, does not speak about itself, 
but about something else: being – whether this being is human or non-human (a cloud in 
the sky, a shower of sparks, the eruption of a volcano, a dog barking, or an airplane fly-
ing). What comes to language, what is expressed and “presents itself” in language is, in 
Gadamer’s terms, “the world itself”. Thanks to language, it has opened a window to the 
world itself beyond language.
Charalambos Tsekeris: Reconstructing Main Epistemological Issues..., Revija za sociologiju 40 (2010), 3: 247–271
254
sibility of “an engaged science not founded in pride, in the assertion of 
an absolute knowledge as the basis for social programmes, but rather in a 
humility about the complexity of the world coupled with a hopeful belief 
in the potential of human beings for doing something about it” (Byrne, 
1998: 45). Moreover, for Byrne, “complexity accounts are foundational-
ist, although they are absolutely not reductionist and positivist… [and] are 
surely part of the modernist programme” (Byrne, 1998: 35). Of course, this 
brings critical realism and chaos/complexity theory very close.
For other scholars, however, complexity is best understood by post-
modernists, particularly within the theoretical traditions of J. Derrida 
and J.-F. Lyotard, because their theories “have an implicit sensitivity for 
the complexity of the phenomena they deal with” (Cilliers, 1998: iix). 
Although Paul Cilliers agrees with Byrne that chaos/complexity is non-
reductionist, anti-essentialist and anti-positivist, he notes that: “Claiming 
that self-organisation is an important property of complex systems is to 
argue against foundationalism. The dynamic nature of self-organisation, 
where the structure of the system is continuously transformed through the 
interaction of contingent, external factors and historical, internal factors, 
cannot be explained by resorting to a single origin or to an immutable 
principle… self-organisation provides the mechanism whereby complex 
structure can evolve without having to postulate first beginnings… It 
is exactly in this sense that postmodern theory contributes to our un-
derstanding of complex self-organising systems” (Cilliers, 1998: 106). 
Nevertheless, both authors reflect upon the chaos/complexity analytical 
framework as:
1.  Directly opposed to both linearity and reductionism.
2.  Hostile to the profound and unnecessary (even dangerous) relativ-
ism/nihilism of some strands of postmodernism.
3.  Friendly to the (restrained) possibility of formal modelling in social 
research.
Let’s now focus on the very “chaos/complexity turn”. Especially since 
the early 1990s, the social sciences began to go “complex”, with a signifi-
cant array of relevant publications. Some innovative “popular” books within 
this field include Kauffman’s The Origins of Order, Casti’s Complexifica-
tion, Arthur’s Increasing Returns and Path-Dependence in the Economy, 
Nicolis’ Introduction to Non-Linear Science, Luhmann’s Social Systems, 
Krugman’s The Self-organizing Economy, Jervis’s System Effects, Rescher’s 
Complexity, Holland’s Emergence, Byrne’s Complexity Theory and the So-
cial Sciences, Kelly’s New Rules for the New Economy, Cilliers’ Complex-
ity and Post-modernism, and Hayles’ How We Became Posthuman.
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From the chaos/complexity standpoint, the social world is seen as an 
open, non-linear and dynamic turbulent system, spontaneously self-produced, 
self-evolved and self-organized, within a continual flow of extremely rapid 
changes, an “infinite flux” (in Gilles Deleuze’s terms) – with huge flows of 
information/communication, energy and matter flowing in and out.
The communicative system of Society, as Niklas Luhmann repeatedly 
and reflexively observed, has indeed “no centre and no head. Representa-
tion of the social totality is impossible and so is steering. The world may 
be adrift like a ship without moorings, but given that there is and can no 
longer be a captain on board to coordinate and steer the operations of the 
different subsystems, the rhetorics of anxiety of the critical theorists only 
show the superfluity of their normative mode of thought and their inca-
pacity to come to terms with the hypercomplexity of modern societies” 
(Vandenberghe, 1999b: 55).
This novel analytical stance is consistently and creatively adopted by 
the new science called “Chaos” (originally developed and flourished within 
the field of physics). The science of Chaos (Gleick, 1987) is a science of 
change. It is the systematic study of non-linear processes, within dynamic 
turbulent systems (human or nonhuman). Characteristic examples of such 
systems are: the global economy and the global crisis, wars and armed 
conflicts, human beings and social organizations, romantic and intimate re-
lationships, business and the stock market, science and technology, political 
campaigns and elections, the Olympic Games, football games and other 
sport events, the weather systems, the internet, World Wide Web, Web 2.0, 
journalism and journalism 2.0, etc.
We thus need to revise deeply the conventional ways of perceiving, 
conceiving and representing6 the pluralized social universe. In such a messy 
context, leadership is no more a top-down phenomenon, an exercise of 
directly controlling outcomes and self-confidently predicting causes and 
effects (a tendency often found in the positivist school of thought). Tradi-
tional leaders must now realize the advent of new concepts and emergent 
paradigms.
6 Of course, representing the inherently complex social world in toto (as well as with 
full accuracy/certainty) is merely chimerical. Hence, the principal strategic aim of social 
simulation modelling should be variously to obtain a better (deeper) theoretical and empiri-
cal understanding of complex human processes, as well as of our own (scientific) meta-
theories and hypotheses, rather than self-confidently and dogmatically to make accurate 
representations and full predictions – at least not beyond a relatively limited “predictabil-
ity horizon”. Additionally, the social researcher now learns  peacefully to keep in mind 
“both how little the single scientist knows in relation to the total community of inquirers, 
and a respect for the complexity of reality” (Kalleberg, 2007: 141).
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Keeping these in mind, and immersed in innovative social scientific 
efforts, complexity researchers systematically and methodologically explore 
the profound implications of local behaviours and actions for global struc-
tures and patterns, and conversely, the deep influence of global factualities 
on local discourses and individual choices (a dual, upward-downward, re-
lational causality).
In this “relational” social research setting, where change is omnipres-
ent, the social, (dis)order, (dis)organization and (mis)understanding reflex-
ively come from chaos, heterogeneity, autopoiesis, agonistic competition, 
irreducible diversity, mutual evolution and emergence (there is always a 
disorderly low level).
In general, complexity research seeks to carefully identify, challenge 
and reconstruct some of the fundamental modes of thinking, living and 
working in contemporary human complex societies. These “networked” 
societies are inherently chaotic systems – that is, both deterministic and 
unpredictable (this sophisticatedly reconciles the unpredictability of non-
linear dynamic systems with a sense of order and structure).
In other words, a chaotic system may appear completely random, but 
there is always an underlying generative “real” order, deeper mechanisms 
and hidden patterns, rules and norms, which patiently wait to be dis-cov-
ered and un-covered (therefore, there is not such a thing as “luck”). But 
even if (positivist, essentialist or realist) social scientists someday arrive at 
the very final stage of “total” or “absolute” knowledge about these “hidden 
patterns, rules and norms”, they will not be capable of predicting!
To put it very simply, a human complex society (as well as any other 
non-linear dynamic system) can never be fully contained in any way – even 
by its own “creator” (i.e. in the special case of a computer-simulated artifi-
cial society). So, any ambitious, long-term planning is inescapably doomed 
to absolute failure. What is actually needed here, consequently, is to reflex-
ively include ourselves, as both researchers and social actors, within this 
inherent general unpredictability.
But complexity theory comprehensively considers non-linear dynamic 
systems in between: they are neither absolutely simple nor completely ran-
dom (encoding thus some, potentially useful, information). This clearly sig-
nifies a constant cycling between chaos and order-creation. The region of 
emergent order-creation exists somewhere between the edges of order and 
chaos. Complexity permanently moves between order and disorder, between 
pure determinism and pure chaos, between simplicity and randomness.
It is therefore not totally incompatible with the critical realist claim 
to truth and (reflexive) objectivity (e.g. the claim to discover fundamental 
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laws of social action and organizational dynamics). As far as “uncertainty” 
is theoretically concerned, social science can and should return to its study 
“rather than the attempt to overcome it, and thereby, re-engage the central-
ity of questioning official knowledge. Researchers would be in a position 
to recognize their own biases and prejudices and, to the extent practicable, 
communicate those to the audience. They could be clear about their politi-
cal objectives and offer a project for positive social transformation together 
with the now ubiquitous critique” (van Heertum, 2005).
5. The issue of self-organization
Self-organization is profoundly embedded in the core of the chaos/complex-
ity epistemic worldview and “can occur dramatically and overwhelmingly, 
like a flood or a torrent moving between or across borders or bounda-
ries” (Urry, 2005: 246). The central (emergentist) logic of self-organization 
theory is that system structures often appear (spontaneously) without any 
explicit pressure or involvement from outside the given system (e.g. the 
involvement of a “designer” or a “creator”).
To put it differently, the various organizational constraints are exclu-
sively internal to the system, resulting (bottom-up) from the very inter-
actions among the heterogeneous constituent components and usually in-
dependent of the physical nature of those components. This fundamental 
logic conveys several philosophical-epistemological implications (cf. Fuchs, 
2003b: 140):
1.  “Self-organizing systems are shaped by a dialectic of determinism 
and indeterminism, necessity and chance. One can say that it incor-
porates both a closed causality and an open causality.”
2.  “Emergence means that many Ones that are opposed to and different 
from many Others synergetically produce a new Whole or Identical 
One.”7
3.  “Self-organizing systems are shaped by a dialectic of globality and 
locality: There are general principles of self-organization that apply 
to all types of self-organizing systems, but also specific principles 
for each special type of system.”
7 Emergence pays attention to multiple levels of analysis (individuals, interactions, and 
social groups), with a special dynamic focus on the bottom-up and fully spontaneous, 
unplanned and unpredictable ways in which group phenomena irreducibly and irreversibly 
result from daily “performative” communication processes among social agents. Even a 
close and careful look at the constituent properties or elements and their interactions can-
not forecast the whole process. Hence, emergence permanently forbids “strong” exhaustive 
explanations and predictions.
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Systemic societal self-organization primarily involves permanent (mi-
cro-macro) processes of both agency and constraining/enabling morphogen-
esis, by which a system can uniquely maintain/reproduce itself and create 
its own unity, visions, values, codes and regularities (see Figure 1). No 
“pure” (strong) position outside the system can be assumed in order to see 
its “blind spots” (Luhmann) and determine its defining parameters (Cilliers, 
2005b: 606).
Figure 1. Systemic societal self-organization both enables and constrains 
actions, individuality, creativity and innovation
Source: Fuchs, 2003a
It is almost customary nowadays for the social scientists and philoso-
phers to formulate knowledge claims (or truth claims) in terms of the gen-
eral notions of social constructedness, contextuality/situatedness, or discur-
sivity. Making predictions has substantially moved “from totem to taboo … 
For all the proscriptions, predictive activity in sociology is commonplace 
… We do not highlight our predictions, however. They remain implicit in 
our work: colleagues can discern them, but they are not made explicit to a 
wider public” (Aldridge, 1999: 5.6). In fact, social scientists and philoso-
phers no longer take risks for fear of being wrong – or of being falsified 
and, therefore, weak.
Nevertheless, self-organization entails that it is not enough for social/
sociological theory to be “refutable” or “provisional” (Cilliers, 2005a); it 
should be definitely weak and imperfect because of the co-emergence of 
knower and setting, or knowledge and action/experience (see e.g. Maturana 
and Varela, 1987),8 as well as because of the very epistemological circular-
ity of the theoretical accounts on this co-emergence (Pels, 2003).
8 As enactivist scholars B. Davis and D. J. Sumara (1997: 110) have argued, knowing “ex-
ists in the interstices of a complex ecology or organismic relationality”. In an “enactivist” 
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We must thus cultivate a self-reflexive ethos of imperfection, against 
all the purism and asceticism of truth-seeking, which still rages academic 
(sociological) research (Pels, 2003). The continuous attempt to understand 
(or to model) human complex systems necessarily involves epistemic mod-
esty, as well as an ethical sense of epistemological weakness that especially 
focuses on our “natural” incapacity to predict.
Following the Nietzschean Eternal Return, the reflexive conception of 
self-organization requires from us to accept openly (and energize) the re-
sponsibility for our claims or models, although we know they are flawed. 
So, self-organization also involves generosity, justice, honesty, integrity and 
sincerity.
6. The issue of unpredictability
Modernity, as a social and historical category, has been closely associated 
to the “received” or “conventional” strong ambition to know, predict and 
manipulate (engineer) the world in toto with total certainty. Sociology’s 
19th-century founders strongly asserted that the discipline was about mak-
ing long-term predictions and hence applying persuasive, practical and 
universally-applicable solutions to real-world social problems.
This was how social science originally invented and justified its idi-
osyncratic epistemic status, in direct contrast to religion or metaphysics, as 
famously expressed by the classical Comtean formula savoir pour prévoir 
et prévoir pour pouvoir, or by Charles Wright Mills’s conclusion (com-
bined with a strong critique of bureaucratic technocracy) that the ultimate 
“purpose of social science is the prediction and control of human behav-
iour” (Mills, 1970: 127).
Human life, however, is inherently dynamic: it is inescapably and 
ceaselessly changing and polymorphous (kaleidoscopic). In other words, it 
may be simple or chaotic, easy or hard, boring or exciting, happy or miser-
able, beautiful or evil. To put it very simply, life is never the same. Change 
is actually constitutive of all sorts of human co-existence/co-operation and 
social living over the ages.
Human behaviour is mostly ambiguous and non-linear; it is character-
ized by a varied disproportionality between (changes to) the input and the 
or “performativist” conception of social order, social structures, relations, patterns, con-
nections and identities are real/imaginary quantities that exist only partially, because they 
are continuously “at stake” in attempts to render them a little bigger or a little smaller. We 
are all in the permanent business of re-negotiating, re-constructing and acting performa-
tively upon them. Therefore, we all contribute to the “reality status” of what is described 
and explained (see Pels, 2002).
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outcome (the so-called butterfly effect). In other words, a small cause often 
has large effects (see e.g. Hayles, 1991: 11). In addition, “similar causes 
can have different effects and different causes similar effects; small changes 
of causes can have large effects whereas large changes can also only result 
in small effects. Hence conceptualizing globalization as an aspect of self-
organizing systems enables us to assume that in a globalizing world there 
are complex, non-linear causal relationships that are stretching across large 
spatio-temporal distances” (Fuchs, 2003b: 112).
That is why global (or glocal) social networks are chaotic systems: 
determinism is structurally coupled with the role of agency, surprise, 
contingency and unintended/unforeseen consequences and side-effects 
(unpredictability).9
•  On the one hand, social institutions, networks and structures are in-
herently fragile, unstable and contingent because choice, imagina-
tion and improvisation are ubiquitous and esoteric in each and every 
individual and collective action. There are always new alternative 
(and unanticipated) roads to fruitful collaboration, innovation and 
creativity. The future is actually open, subversively enigmatic and 
potentially full of surprises (for better or for worse...).
•  On the other hand, a systematic, well-informed and carefully detailed 
historiographical approach can easily demonstrate persistent (hidden) 
patterns, mechanisms and trends underlying the relative “directional-
ity” of social and political change and evolution. Modern notions of 
“path dependency” now seem very relevant and realistic, so that they 
get seriously re-energized and re-introduced to the context of analy-
sis. Common global developments are thus far from purely erratic 
and arbitrary, but still unpredictable in the long run (i.e. beyond the 
so-called predictability horizon).
Self-organized patterns of interconnections, interrelations and inter-
dependencies are continually created and re-created through an “endless 
9 Chaotic systems are intriguingly rule-based; they are both deterministic and unpredictable 
(both chaotic and systems) at the same time. Even very simple and explainable systems, 
whose parameters and rules of interaction are clearly defined, can exhibit chaotic behaviour. 
Chaotic systems generate behaviour with the appearance of complete randomness by means 
of a purely deterministic rule. Deterministic chaos shows sensitivity to initial conditions, 
in that small or trivial differences of a state (at any given moment) lead rapidly to multiple 
and widely diverging states. It rather seems that there is always a permanent undecidable 
tension, as well as a paradoxical demiurgic compatibility, between unpredictability (uncer-
tainty) and determinism (certainty), between contingency and directionality. We therefore 
need to challenge deeply and radically and revise the old conventional ways of perceiving 
and conceiving our increasingly pluralized “post-human” social and historical universe.
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dance of co-emergence” (Waldrop, 1992: 75). Therefore, any social theo-
retical attempt to change (or to save) the world is indeed too weak: “social 
development can’t be steered because society is a complex, self-organizing 
system” (Fuchs, 2003b: 164). Nobody can actually (voluntaristically or not) 
situate her/himself above societal dynamics, independent of her/his author-
ity, prestige, institutional position or epistemological standpoint. In any 
case, this should not subtract from the huge importance and significance 
of (knowledgeable) human agency and intervention. Especially in periods 
of crisis and acute struggle, human agency and intervention can still make a 
decisive historical difference for all of us and for the next generations. But 
the very fact of “unpredictability” implies that we can never know what 
difference it will make!
Furthermore, the multi-scale nature and complexity of self-organized 
social networks are crucial features in better understanding (and model-
ling) them. Both methodological and epistemological advances in human 
complex systems (see Tsekeris, 2009) are providing an integrated frame-
work, without however achieving true (strong) predictive power of their 
behaviour. Of course, regularities are not excluded: “laws can be proposed 
and validated (or negated) via empirical means, but they can be formu-
lated only in a probabilistic manner” (Katerelos, 2007). This particularly 
denotes that “unpredictability” and “indeterminacy”, as significant consti-
tutive features of the social world, should always be placed at the centre 
of the analysis.10
After all, what about the very future of human complex systems? A 
very simple, modest and pragmatic answer is that we just “cannot pre-
dict or control this future, these futures. One lesson of Chaos Theory is 
that no-one else can, either. The will to predict is always doomed and 
counter-productive. Life, whether social, cultural or digital, is inherently 
complex” (Hodge and Lally, 2006).11 This is indeed an epistemologically 
weak answer!
10 Within current complexity research, “unpredictability” is frequently used in two differ-
ent senses (Katerelos, 2007): (1) On the one hand, it “involves the overwhelming failure 
of the modern sociological (and social scientific) projects to fully contain social dynam-
ics, or to obtain full analytic access to future social and historical developments”. (2) On 
the other hand, it “denotes an essential feature concerning the nature and character of all 
complex or chaotic systems … In a ‘self-organizing’ or ‘autopoietic’ social universe, where 
(dis)order, (mis)understanding and (dis)unity reflexively come from agonistic competition, 
irreducible diversity, mutual evolution, emergence, or chaotic noise..., the future just be-
comes a mere possibility”.
11 A quite simple mathematical analysis could easily show that, even in simple and ex-
plainable systems, which obey Newton’s laws of motion, we cannot always and accurately 
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In the highly contingent, speedy, dynamic and risky universe of self-
organized social networks, any strong, authoritarian “top-down” control (or 
promethean engineering) of information spread, opinion formation, free will 
and self-expression is completely impossible and undesirable. Equally un-
desirable is a predictable, linear, hierarchical, stable, orderly, homogenous 
and pure human world (unpredictability is not a curse anymore).
This would probably be a very hopeless, colourless, dull and boring 
world: A completely grey social universe (against human nature itself!). In 
addition, there is indeed a small degree of optimism about the future, by 
strategically focusing upon critical possibilities rather than limitations. As 
Immanuel Wallerstein perceptively notes, “the future... is open to possibil-
ity, and therefore to a better world … Hence we should act in order to re-
alise an alternative, democratic, participatory, humane form of globalization 
that is based on global alliance technology, global ecological sustainability, 
global wealth, a global participatory agora, and a global noosphere. New 
forms of globalization and governance are needed, globalization is in need 
of global wisdom and global co-operation” (Fuchs, 2003b: 164).
The future dynamic evolution of emerging social networks (online and 
offline) can be coarsely projected up to a certain time horizon (predict-
ability horizon), but it cannot be fully predicted with certainty and preci-
sion in the long run (see Katerelos and Koulouris, 2004). Namely, predict-
ing the future of human complex systems could be rather considered as 
an epistemologically weak, irresolvable riddle. But the irreducible social, 
cultural and historical potential of dynamic social networking, re-creation, 
co-action, co-operation and self-organization is nevertheless here, for better 
or for worse!
7. The issue of reflexivity
Methodological reflexivity (also known as “epistemological circularity”), 
as a systematic means to deeper and better understanding of the complex 
“knowledge-making enterprise, including a consideration of the subjective, 
institutional, social, and political processes whereby research is conducted 
and knowledge is produced” (Alvesson, 2007), has been rendered one of 
the most attractive sociological buzzwords of our time, especially after the 
advent of chaos/complexity theory. In particular, the reflexive awareness 
predict what is going to happen next. This is because of a persistent instability, as well 
as of an undecidable multiplicity of forces that variously affect and act upon an object. 
For sure, any attempt to predict a simple system’s future behaviour over long times will 
be defeated. Of course, this does not mean that we can say nothing about the dynamic 
properties and processes of the system.
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of the mutual dependency of sociological categories (e.g. risk, citizenship, 
space, time, modernity, morality) and social practice has been increasingly 
brought right at the forefront of hot epistemological debates.
From the social epistemological standpoint of chaos/complexity theory, 
the self (including the epistemological/sociological self) is rather reflexive-
ly re-created; it is necessarily intertwined with the real world and dialecti-
cally re-constituted by the on-going, mutual, synergetic and self-organizing 
interaction of the ego with emergent structures and the other.12 It thus ap-
pears neither as a mere “object” of knowledge, nor as an empirical ego 
that lacks autonomy, agency, imagination, choice, creativity, improvisation 
and spontaneity. In other words, the subject is not passive, self-assured and 
narcissistically private any more (see Tsivacou, 2005).
Instead of seeing subjectivity as an isolated, independent and self-con-
tained locus of individual experience (according to the classical Cartesian 
ego), chaos/complexity theory, in the open spirit of Ludwig Binswanger 
(1963), fruitfully co-relates it with objectivity and inter-subjectivity, through 
an (endless) uncertain circular-dialectical process, without however reduc-
ing ontological questions to epistemological ones (just as Kant did), or 
“facts” to performative descriptions and interpretations, symbolic categories 
and conceptual frameworks.
Within the chaos/complexity (reflexive-realist)13 framework, knowledge 
cannot and should not be erroneously confounded with the “recording and 
analysis of the ‘pre-notions’ (in Durkheim’s sense) that social agents en-
gage in the construction of social reality; it must also encompass the social 
conditions of the production of these pre-constructions and of the social 
agents who produce them” (Bourdieu, 2003: 282).14 This is of course in 
line with Roy Bhaskar’s or Pierre Bourdieu’s stance of critical/relational re-
alism, but not with Anthony Giddens’s ultra-activistic structuration theory, 
12 In parallel, what should also be reflexively recognized is the importance of the “I-thou” 
relationship (Buber, 1970), which was the very essence of the great Socratic dialogues. 
This relationship has been involved with the original introduction of second-person inter-
subjective methodologies, such as Bohmian dialogue, leading to innovative forms of “dia-
logic consciousness” (Bohm, 1985).
13 For the notion of reflexive realism, see Pels, 2000.
14 Of course, this should carefully refrain from any sort of “last-instance” objectivism and 
decisively move towards a rather never-ending reflexive dialectic between micro and mac-
ro, action and structure, transformation and reproduction, individuality and sociality (or in-
dividual and collective action), randomness and simplicity, contingency and directionality, 
emergence and social causation (Sawyer, 2007), as well as towards a generalized critique 
of naïve/uncritical/unreflexive realism, reification and essentialism, at the level of both 
everyday world-making and professional scientific (sociological/organizational) analysis.
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or with Berger/Luckmann’s subjectivistic accounts of social constructiv-
ism, which implicitly reproduce and naively celebrate the old tradition of 
phenomenological individualism.
But, in the context of chaos/complexity theory, the eye of the “ob-
server” (Luhmann) is always there. The very fact that these “social condi-
tions” (or the “generative mechanisms”) are only observable through their 
consequences raises the reflexive problem of their representation. That is, 
how do we know that invisible conditions, mechanisms, figurations or 
structures really exist? Who speaks for them (or in their name)? And who 
has accorded the essential primacy of the invisible (unobservable) over the 
visible (observable)? Such reflexive-critical questions about the representa-
tion of “noumenal” or “transfactual” entities, as well as about the role of 
their “spokespersons”,15 give us access to a genuine reflexive sociology of 
intellectuals (see Pels, 1999).16
From the reflexive-realist viewpoint of chaos/complexity theory, the 
radical constructivists should abandon their extreme ontological nihilism 
and make only methodological use of such notions as relativism, construc-
tivism, performativity, and reflexivity. This will eventually show us “how 
‘reality’ – that is, the descriptions, re-descriptions, and constructions of re-
ality, but not reality itself, of course, which exists independently of those 
descriptions in the same way as the dog barks whether we have a concept 
of it or not – is ‘performatively’ constructed as a matter of course by their 
spokespersons. Such a move from ontological to methodological nominal-
ism implies a consequent switch from a ‘deconstructivist’ to a genuinely 
‘constructivist’ posture, from construction to something more akin to phe-
nomenological constitution” (Vandenberghe, 1999a: 35, n. 7).
8. The issue of normativity
Hence, most importantly, our knowledge’s own (unavoidable) circularity 
and self-organization should be openly acknowledged and actively celebrat-
ed. This explicitly champions a non-hasty and modest “circular reasoning” 
over arrogant and self-sufficient (self-immunizing) rationalist/foundational-
ist claims for intellectual access to totality. In other words, it explicitly 
champions the radical (early) ethnomethodological conception of (constitu-
15 Spokespersonship involves the ubiquitous, communication-dependent representational 
work of publicly performing, evoking, or making visible and available that which is absent 
and therefore falls outside the horizon of immediate control, which is not able to speak for 
itself (people, things, facts, or relations).
16 Hence, chaos/complexity theory might potentially provoke an effective reflexive sensiti-
zation of the critical realist argumentation.
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tive) reflexivity that comprehensively entails “the intimate interdependence 
between representation and represented object... such that the sense of the 
former is elaborated by drawing on knowledge of the latter, and knowl-
edge of the latter is elaborated by that which is known about the former” 
(Woolgar, 1988: 33).
Such a kind of performative “knowledge politics” is neither self-re-
futing nor a relativism of the all-cats-are-grey variety (weak knowledge is 
not “any” knowledge), since it non-opportunistically offers itself as a weak 
and self-organizing criterion of truth, by critically displaying the dialectical 
“projective relationship between the spokesperson and that which is spoken 
for” (Pels, 2000: 17). This ultimately waives all authoritarian macho claims 
for “independent” realities, “transcendental” truths and “obligatory” episte-
mological foundations (Pels, 1995: 1036), paving however the enthusiastic 
and promising way to an ethically responsible and radically reflexive mode 
of critique.17
As the radical sceptical ethics of self-organization and circular reflex-
ive reasoning is being brought right at the heart of current epistemologi-
cal/sociological and interdisciplinary debates, we do maximize our fruitful 
chances to surprisingly discover a wholly new intellectual and academic life 
conduct: “Less egotism, both individual and collective, and more awareness 
of how we all constitute each other: this could be a path toward lower-
ing intellectual acrimony in the future” (Collins, 2002: 70). In such terms, 
caring for the other signifies an essential normative prerequisite for both 
social and scientific living (Tsivacou, 2005: 520–522), against old modern 
hardness and classical power talk.
Paul Cilliers perceptively links complexity with the so-called norma-
tive dimension: “We only have limited access to a complex world and 
when we are dealing with the limits of our understanding, we are dealing 
with ethics” (Cilliers, 2005a: 261). Since innocent knowledge (or pure ob-
jectivity) is undoubtedly “chimerical” and the essential interconnectedness 
(togetherness) of our world cannot be denied or concealed anymore, we are 
now dramatically condemned to deal with matters of individual and collec-
tive responsibility: Making choices is completely inescapable.
The issue of normativity is hence intimately associated with “our very 
understanding of complexity. Ethical considerations are not to be enter-
tained as something supplementing our dealings with social systems. They 
are always already part of what we do. One could attempt to deny that and 
17 This also champions a creative on-going interplay between the ontological, the episte-
mological and the ethical, according to Karl Mannheim’s famous “magic triangle” (Pels, 
2003).
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operate as if one can deal with complexity in an objective way – as if we 
can calculate everything – and thereby avoid the normative dimension. But 
this denial of the ethical becomes an avoidance of responsibility and is, of 
course, ethical in itself, albeit a negative (and much too prevalent) ethics” 
(Cilliers, 2005a: 264).
The essential and irreducible normative dimension is also involved 
with the classical issue of autonomy. Autonomy, guaranteed by open, un-
interrupted and unbiased dialogue, meaningfully emerges as a necessarily 
socialized “moral principle in given historical communities” and spontane-
ously elevates the self into the being who suffers from – and critically re-
sists – systemic and organizational restrictions (Tsivacou, 2005: 519, 521). 
As Niklas Luhmann (1995) intriguingly observes, the concept of the World 
(Welt) paradoxically represents a demiurgic combination of restriction and 
freedom, suffering and resistance, determination and indetermination, unit 
and difference, the past and the future.18
Embracing the relational “normative dimension” thus helps us in see-
ing ourselves “with the eyes of the other” (Heinz von Foerster), as well 
as in moving beyond the Enlightenment need for grand intellectual heroes, 
or compassionate social engineers (designing unflawed systems), and the 
utopian/narcissistic modernist dreams (delusions) of unlimited theoretical 
wisdom and epistemological perfection – without however devaluing sci-
ence or eschewing issues of value, justice, politics and accountability.
It also helps us to expand radically the famous “it could be otherwise” 
vision (Charles W. Mills) of social thought, as well as to see “beyond the 
end of our noses” and seriously/responsibly assess the likelihood of (lo-
cal) social change and emancipatory social scenarios, under the multiple 
restraints of the chaos/complexity framework.
9. Final considerations and future orientations
Recent theoretical and methodological advances within chaos/complexity 
social research in general help us seriously and imaginatively to re-think 
and re-decide about the persistent, ambiguous, complicated and highly dis-
puted issues of predictability/unpredictability, reflexivity, and normativity 
(ethics). It is likely that many of the arrogant (self-assured) long-term pre-
18 In the same paradoxical line, psychic systems refer to both internal conflictual phenom-
ena (auto-reference) and phenomena of the environment (hetero-reference), always using 
their own communications. So, “everything seems to be negotiated on the edge between 
social and individual. Each time that our agents ‘move’ socially they destabilize their 
intra-consistency and, each time that they attain some kind of internal equilibrium, social 
influence comes to disturb them” (Katerelos and Koulouris, 2004: 5.2).
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dictions unreflexively and uncritically overestimate the role and limits of 
(social) science and technology.19 The general conclusion that “we cannot 
make purely objective and final claims about our complex world”, clearly 
entails that “we have to make choices and thus we cannot escape the nor-
mative or ethical domain” (Cilliers, 2005a: 259).
Without suffering from an “illusion of control”, social scientists (re-
searchers) have always to keep in mind that human societies are mostly 
fluid and complex/chaotic and, of course, do not work like a Swiss clock 
(cause and effect are not proportional any more). The essential principle of 
“sensitivity to initial conditions” makes us better understand the overwhelm-
ing existence of critical turning points everywhere in the social structure 
(e.g. the spread of a small piece of information may cause a stock market 
or a government to fall). In other words, it makes us better understand what 
our society really is.
Subsequently, chaos/complexity theory might indeed boost our “socio-
logical imagination” (as defined by Charles W. Mills). Most importantly, 
it might turn out to be very central to our future knowledge explorations, 
as well as to the further genuine development of social thought, including 
the genuine development of social science theory and methodology (see 
Cilliers, 2005b).
Drawing from Sandra L. Bloom’s innovative thoughts (2000), as well 
as from J. Briggs’s and F. D. Peat’s original work (1999), social/sociologi-
cal theory can and should eventually learn many “life lessons” from the 
very science of chaos/complexity:
•  Human behaviour, individual or collective, is not predictable (even 
if simple and explainable) – at least, not beyond a relatively short 
“predictability horizon”. In fact, we do not actually need predictabil-
ity, stability and equilibrium.
•  There is not such a thing as “objective observation”, “pure knowl-
edge”, “innocent method”, or “access to totality”. But we should 
always look for a small measure of synthesis and objectivity, within 
a constantly changing and increasingly antagonistic social world.
19 These developments tend gradually and irreversibly to “bend, shift, and transform the 
limits of what we think is possible. It is virtually impossible to predict the full conse-
quences of all of our actions, and we cannot predict how society and the global order 
might change in response to new technologies … but science should not ignore our moral 
or ethical responsibility to consider all the risks either” (Virdi, 2008: 41). According to 
Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s perceptive observations, technoscience “cannot isolate itself from 
social responsibility or should be given a monopoly on decision-maker power” (Virdi, 
2008: 41).
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•  Output (effect) is not proportional to input (cause). Thus, local re-
arrangements may bring unforeseen, unintended and unanticipated 
global transformations and side-effects (for the better or for the 
worse).
•  Chaos is neither avoidable nor destructive; instead, it is can be seen 
as a unique opportunity/capacity to act and change, as well as some-
thing we should responsibly accept, acknowledge, embrace, celebrate 
and live with.
•  We should suspend the “old” or “received” notion that anything can 
be understood and explained in isolation from anything else. On the 
contrary, all life is truly and irrevocably interconnected.
•  The playful interdependency of all being gives us enormous hope 
that there is indeed something beyond the fragmented, reductionistic 
and exploitative view of human nature. In addition, it is chaos itself 
that guarantees the very possibility of free will and choice.
•  Creativity can overcome the odds and bend the rules. It can also 
help us think better and move forward, decisively freed from the 
obsessive-compulsive struggle for control and prediction.
In the last instance, these stimulating “life lessons” can triumphant-
ly encourage a genuine reflexive return to the creative transdisciplinary 
style of thinking, which originally inspired the sociological enterprise. Of 
course, as Anthony Giddens perceptively points out, “a little bit more uto-
pian thinking might help too – well, why not? Politics in some ways has 
become deadly dull. We need more positive ideals in the world, but not 
empty ones – rather, they should be ideals that link to realistic possibilities 
of change” (Giddens, 2006).
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Članak nastoji pružiti opširan kritički pregled ključnih tema i dilema u suvre-
menoj društvenoj misli, kao i u širokom polju teorije i metodologije društvene 
znanosti. U tom kontekstu, nudi neke teorijske poticaje i vidike za ozbiljno i ima-
ginativno ponovno promišljanje i odlučivanje o trajnim, složenim, dvosmislenim 
i široko raspravljanim temama predvidljivosti/nepredvidljivosti, refleksivnosti i 
normativnosti (etike). Tvrdi se da korisni sintetički uvidi utemeljeni na teoriji ka-
osa i kompleksnosti mogu i da trebali bi imati važnu ulogu u ispravljanju dobro 
utvrđenih pravaca mišljenja (konkretno, realizma i kritičkog realizma), kao i u 
primjerenoj raspravi o tim ključnim općim temama.
Ključne riječi: sociologija, epistemologija, znanje, metodologija, realizam, teorija 
kaosa/kompleksnosti
